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Loder v. Municipal Court, 43 Cal. App.
3d 231, 117 Cal. Rptr. 533 (1974)
Joseph Loder was arrested and charged with disturbing the peace,
battery, and resisting arrest for attacking a police officer who was
clubbing Mrs. Loder. Under a covenant not to sue, the charges
against him were dismissed. Loder then petitioned for a writ of
mandate to have the record of his arrest removed from the police
files. The petition was denied. The Court of Appeals affirmed.1
Loder was not rehired when information of his arrest was given
to the San Diego Unified School District pursuant to California
Education Code sections 13169.2 and 13588.2 The court noted that
his absenteeism may have been a factor in this decision. Loder's
claim that the dissemination of his arrest record was an unconstitu-
tional invasion of his privacy was rejected in a summary manner
by the court. "The sealing of an arrest record is a matter of legis-
lative grace; the court has no power to seal or expunge the record
unless there is statutory authorization. 3
The current statutory scheme for the sealing of arrest and convic-
tion records in California extends only to juvenile offenders and
defendants convicted of misdemeanors committed while under the
age of eighteen. 4 A minor who has been adjudged a ward or de-
pendent child of the court, or has been taken before a probation
officer, or any other law enforcement officer may, after five years
or upon reaching majority, petition the court to seal all records
of the case. This relief will only be granted where the person has
not, since the termination of jurisdiction, been convicted of a felony
1. Loder v. Municipal Court, 43 Cal. App. 3d 231, 117 Cal. Rptr. 533
(1974) [hereinafter Loder].
2. CAL. ED. CODE § 13169.2 (West 1969) authorizes the State Bureau of
Criminal Identification and Information (C.I.I.) to furnish all information
pertaining to any applicant to the State Board of Education. CAL. ED. CODE
§ 13588 (West 1969) provides for the transfer of records of arrest or convic-
tion of applicants to the local school district.
3. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 233, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
4. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a, 851.7 (West 1970). See Baum,
Wiping Out a Criminal or Juvenile Record, 40 CAL. J. ST. B. 816, 828-29(1965) for an outline of the statutory scheme in California.
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or any misdemeanor involving moral turpitude and has been reha-
bilitated to the satisfaction of the court.5 The effect of "sealing"
is to completely erase the events themselves. The proceedings are
"deemed never to have occurred and the person may respond ac-
cordingly to any inquiry about the events, records of which are
sealed."6
A juvenile who is merely arrested for a misdemeanor may also
have his records sealed if he is released, acquitted, or if the charges
are dismissed, unless the arrest was for a sex offense requiring regis-
tration, a narcotics offense under Division 10 of the Health and
Safety Code, or a traffic violation.7 A recent holding has extended
this relief to persons convicted of a misdemeanor under Division
10 of the Health and Safety Code if the offense is not "punishable
as a felony" under § 11362 of the Health and Safety Code.8 Sealing
is also available to a defendant who is convicted of a misdemeanor,
committed while under the age of eighteen, who has fulfilled the
conditions of his probation or has complied with the sentence of
the courtY
Another type of relief, commonly referred to as "expungent," is
available to an adult convicted of a crime who has fulfilled the
conditions of his parole' ° and to a defendant convicted of a misde-
meanor committed while under the age of eighteen who has com-
plied with the sentence of the court." The defendant is permitted
to withdraw his plea of guilty and enter a plea of not guilty, or
the court will set aside a verdict of guilty. Thereupon, the court
dismisses the accusation or information against the defendant and
releases him from all penalties and disabilities resulting from his
conviction.' 2
Expungement is not nearly as extensive as the relief granted to
juveniles under the sealing statutes.' 3 Although many of the for-
5. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781 (a) (West 1972).
6. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE § 781(a) (West 1970).
7. CAL. PEN. CODE § 851.7 (West 1970).
8. People v. Ryser, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 5, 114 Cal. Rptr. 688, 670 (1974).
9. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.45 (West 1970).
10. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4 (West 1970).
11. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4a (West 1970).
12. CAL. PEN. CODE §§ 1203.4, 1203.4a (West 1970).
13. See Booth, The Expungement Myth, 38 L.A. BAR BULL. 161, 163
(1963), "[U]nless he is under [eighteen] at the time of the offense, the ex-
pungement process offers little more than mythical benefits."
mal disabilities created by law for convicted felons are removed,
the conviction may nevertheless be used in proceedings under pro-
fessional and occupational licensing laws.14 The statutes, by their
terms, allow use of the conviction in a subsequent criminal proceed-
ing against the defendant. 15 The real disability not eliminated by
expungement is the stifling effect of the conviction on chances for
employment and economic advancement. 6
Unlike the sealing provisions relating to juveniles, the expunge-
ment statutes do not permit a person to deny that he was arrested
or convicted when asked by prospective employers.oa The sealing
laws related to juveniles contemplate that the records of the case
be returned to the juvenile court for safekeeping or be destroyed
in order to protect the juvenile from unauthorized disclosure.' 7
The "expungement" of records with respect to adults provides no
procedure for reporting the dismissal entered pursuant to Penal
Code § 1203.4 to the State Bureau of Criminal Identification and
Investigation.'8
14. In re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1951) (disbarment);
Meyer v. Medical Board, 34 Cal. 2d 62, 206 P.2d 1085 (1949) (suspensionby state Medical Board); CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 117 (West 1974).
15. CAL. PEN. CODE § 1203.4a (West 1970).
16. A survey by the New York Civil Liberties Union indicated that 75%
of New York area employment agencies would not accept for referral an
applicant with an arrest record. Another survey of 75 employers indicated
that 66 of them would not consider employing a man who had been arrestedfor assault and acquitted. Schwartz and Skolnik, Two Studies of Legal
Stigma, 10 SOCIAL PROB. 133 (1962).
16a. See In Re Phillips, 17 Cal. 2d 55, 109 P.2d 344 (1941), in which theSupreme Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the action taken un-der Penal Code section 1203.4 operated to set aside the judgment of convic-
tion so that there was never a final judgment upon which the Court couldhave based its order of disbarment. "[I]t cannot be assumed that the leg-
islature intended that such action by the trial court under section 1203.4
should be considered as obliterating the fact that the defendant had beenfinally adjudged guilty of a crime .... That final judgment of conviction
is a fact; and its effect cannot be nullified for the purpose here involved,disbarment either by the order of probation or by the later order dismissing
the action after judgment." The courts have not considered whether a per-
son convicted of a misdemeanor can deny that fact when asked. Since there
are no penalties or disabilities attached to the conviction of a misdemeanor,
the expungement statutes would be of no practical effect to a person whose
misdemeanor conviction was expunged thereunder.
But see 1 Ops. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 611 (1943) in the case of an applicant
for a real estate license whose conviction of a felony had been expunged,
the Attorney General indicated that the applicant must answer "yes" in re-
sponse to a question which asked whether he had ever been convicted of
any violation of law. However, the applicant is free to add that the convic-
tion was expunged pursuant to the relevant section of the Penal Code.17. T.N.G. v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 767, 778, n.12, 484 P.2d 981, 987,
n.12, 94 Cal. Rptr. 813, 819, n.12 (1971).
18. 36 OPs. CAL. ATY. GEN. 1 (1960).
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A further provision of the Penal Code allows a peace officer to
release a person arrested without a warrant before taking him to
a magistrate, if the officer is satisfied that there is no ground for
a criminal complaint. Such a detention is not deemed an arrest
and the record must so disclose. 19 However, there is no further
provision for sealing, obliterating, or preventing dissemination of
such records.
An adult who is arrested and subsequently exonerated has no
right under the law of California to require that his fingerprints,
photographs, or other criminal identification or arrest records be
expunged, or that their dissemination be restricted.20  The courts
of California have declined to grant relief on the grounds that the
question whether such records should be expunged or restricted is
particularly within the province of the legislature and that, in the
absence of authorization from the latter, the court is powerless to
grant relief.21 Relief was denied in Loder on this basis. 22  The
court rejected, without any serious consideration, the contention
that dissemination of the petitioner's arrest record was an uncon-
stitutional invasion of his right to privacy.23
The recent California decision in People v. Ryser"24 was relied upon.
(T)he perpetrator of a public offense may not characterize the
public consequences of arrest and conviction as an invasion of a
constitutionally protected right of privacy.25
Ryser involved the petition of a juvenile to seal the records of
his conviction for a misdemeanor. When an individual is exon-
erated, rather than convicted, the determination whether privacy
has been invaded requires analysis based upon other considerations.
The Supreme Court of the United States first held that there
was a constitutional right to privacy in Griswold v. Connecticut.2
The court, in giving substance to this right, held that the right to
19. CAL. PEN. CODE § 849 (West 1974).
20. Sterling v. Oakland, 208 Cal App. 2d 1, 4, 24 Cal. Rptr. 696, 698
(1962).
21. People v. Ryser, 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974).
22. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 233, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
23. Id. 117 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
24. 40 Cal. App. 3d 1, 114 Cal. Rptr. 668 (1974).
25. 43 Cal. App. 3d at 233, 117 Cal. Rptr. at 534.
26. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
privacy is so rooted in the traditions and conscience of our laws
that it is a' fundamental right.27
The courts of other jurisdictions have concluded that the reten-
tion or dissemination of the arrest record of one who has been exon-
erated is an unconstitutional invasion of privacy and that such
record should be expunged or returned when the harm to the in-
dividual's right to privacy or the dangers of unwarranted adverse
consequences outweigh the public interest in retaining the rec-
ords. 28
There is a direct correlation between the loss of privacy and the
retention of the arrest records as an exonerated person. His
privacy and dignity as a human being is invaded so long as the
government keeps his records in a criminal identification file.29
This information, labeled as a record of arrest, may subject the in-
dividual to serious difficulties if it becomes known. Opportunities
for education, employment, and professional licenses may be re-
stricted or non-existent.30 The decision of the school district not
to re-hire Loder is a case in point. A further consequence is the
exhibition of the arrestee's photograph to other citizens in a rogue's
gallery of the kind commonly used by police to identify potential
suspects.3 ' Increased police scrutiny and the extrajudicial conse-
quences resulting from an arrest record are substantial invasions
of privacy and must rest upon a showing of compelling necessity
by the state for their retention.32
The public interest in effective law enforcement requires the re-
tention of criminal records. Upon arrest, the right of privacy of
the accused is outweighed by the necessity of protecting society,
no matter how mistaken the arrest may have been.3 3
However, when he is exonerated, no public good is accomplished
by the retention of these records. The value of the records depends
upon whether the accused did in fact commit the crime. When he
is exonerated the reason for retaining the records no longer exists.3 4
The consequences of Joseph Loder's arrest record on his employ-
27. Id. at 487 (concurring opinion).
28. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211 (D.C.P.R. 1971); United
States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.C. Mich. 1967). Davidson v. Dill,
503 P.2d 157 (Colo. 1972); Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 487 P.2d 211,
Annot., 46 A.L.R.3d 889 (1971).
29. United States v. Kalish,. 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (1967).
30. Kowall v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 211, 214-215 (1971).
31. Eddy v. Moore, 5 Wash. App. 334, 338, 487 P.2d 211, 216 (1971).
32. 5 Wash. App. at 338, 487 P.2d at 217.
33. 271 F. Supp. at 970.
34. 5 Wash. App. at 338, 487 P.2d at 216.
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ment amply demonstrates the degree to which an individual's
privacy may be infringed by police retention of arrest records.
The legislature is the most appropriate agency for devising a
scheme to balance the rights of society against the invasion of the
individual's right to privacy. However, it is the function of our
courts to hold the line against an assault upon privacy where the
legislature has failed to act.
ELLIOT L. SHELTON
